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marble frieze, in the "shifting perspectives" of Herodotus, in the concentric masses and clustered molecules of Anaximander and Leucippus, in the groups of ordered activities of Plato's Ideal State.

The exposition of all Greek thought as simply illustrative of one idea, *sophrosyne*, is worked out in a thoughtful and suggestive manner; but the author has not escaped the danger, necessarily involved in such a method of exposition, of one-sidedness and exaggeration. Occasionally, indeed, he is betrayed into something near akin to an equivocation. For example, to identify the "middle term" in a chain of syllogistic reasoning (in geometry) with the "moderation in all things" of popular thinking is surely to strain a chance similarity of expression beyond reasonable limits. The fact, too, that the products of Ionian thought are more important than any other contribution to the totality of Greek philosophy is interpreted sometimes so as to give the impression that nothing but Ionia need be considered at all. On the other hand, the influence of this idea of limit, of self-control based upon knowledge, is demonstrated in an interesting way, and the analysis of the various pre-Socratic philosophies (in which the writer agrees mainly with Burnet) is admirable. The place of Socrates, and his relations to the Athenian democracy, are explained clearly and with sympathetic insight. The account given of Plato and Aristotle, especially of the latter, is, however, unsatisfactory, owing chiefly to its incompleteness. To assert that Aristotle was a "theoretical not a practical" thinker, and to justify this statement by a detailed analysis of his physical treatises alone,—dismissing his other writings in a few sentences,—is certainly to fall short of a fair or adequate exposition of one to whom, directly and indirectly, we, in common with the ancient world, owe so much.

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THROUGH NATURE TO GOD. By John Fiske. London: Macmillan & Co., 1899. Pp. xv., 195.

This little work is rather addressed to the devout believer in Evolution than to one who takes a wider view of speculation. Its writer claims to propound "a wholly new line of reasoning" by which Theism is harmonized with, and proved by, the Doctrine of Evolution. Accepting Herbert Spencer's definition of life as the

adjustment of inner states to outer relations, he goes on to remark that increasing complexity and perfection of such adjustment mark the advance of the Evolutionary process: but Man is the highest product and sphere of Evolution, and in Man again the highest element is the religious consciousness, which implies the quasi-human God, Morality, immortality. The adjustment of the human soul to God is the highest form of life: it implies a real relation of realities, a real adjustment of inner to outer, unless the principle of Evolution, found valid in the sphere of the seen world, must not be extended to the sphere where one side of the relation lies beyond human knowledge. Professor Fiske contends that this extension is inevitable. This is the passage through Nature to God.

Such is the argument of the third section of the book: the two preceding sections respectively discuss, also from the standpoint of Evolution, the "Mystery of Evil," and the relation of Ethics to the Cosmic process. The key to the former problem is found in the universal law that without change and contrast there can be no consciousness; thus feeling, as an element of conscious life, depends on antagonism: without evil there can be no good; otherwise, as is significantly substituted a few lines lower down (p. 25), good could not be recognized as such, or distinguished from evil. Evolution is the gradual elimination of evil, by a process which seems to us indeed wasteful, but is essential to the strengthening of character. In the end all evil will be destroyed, save such a memory of evil as may form a background rendering possible the reality of the predominant good. The sections on the relation of Ethics to the Cosmic process are directed against Huxley's idea that the ethical world is a merely transitory phase in a greater process which is non-ethical. Professor Fiske maintains that the Ethical world is the highest stage of the Cosmical process: the evolution of the Cosmos tended to the genesis of man: man could not have persisted without the unselfish devotion implied in the family and the care of the young in their prolonged infancy: this altruism is the root of morals and religion, and these again are the highest results of the evolution of Man.

These arguments must appeal to those thinkers who believe that Evolution is the principle which solves the riddle of the universe, and seek to harmonize it with transcendental assumptions. But it is obvious that their justification depends on much that is not made explicit. Evolution certainly involves an end: but it is not

certain that a minute factor in the process should foresee the perhaps infinitely remote end of the universal Evolution. It is not shown why Man and the perfection of Man should be the supreme goal of the Cosmic process: it appears more compatible with such a line of thought to conceive, as Huxley did, that Man is a fleeting product in the millennial Cosmic process. If so, why should not Religion and Morality be rather human delusions by means of which Evolution serves purposes of its own which lie beyond the ken of the human spirit? Professor Fiske depends on what is for him a foregone conclusion. Again, he assumes a quasi-human, absolute God, a God immanent in the Universe: but what is the relation of this God to Evolution? How is God, further, at once immanent in and externally related to, the human spirits which are evolved by more perfect adjustments to God? And it may be asked whether the good in God is absolute or relative to Evil: if the former, the impossibility of a positive Good is given up: if the latter, God is not perfect. And as regards human good, it appears paradoxical that Evolution should proceed by eliminating an essential factor and thus tend to non-entity; or it is paradoxical that if good and evil are essential to each other, an infinitely small portion of the one should serve to make possible an infinitely great portion of the other.

These and similar difficulties seem latent in Professor Fiske's pleasant and confident reasonings.

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HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. By Dr. W. Windelband, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Strassburg. Authorized translation by Herbert Ernest Cushman, Ph. D., Instructor in Philosophy in Tufts' College. From the second German edition. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. Pp. xv., 393.

An eminent psychologist who had received his training at the very source of modern experimental laboratory psychology, and who was himself in charge of one of the most important psychological laboratories in the world, once expressed his bitter disappointment that so often the labor in the laboratories was expended in employing psychology as an aid in the study of physiological problems. Or, if these pioneers in the new psychology did perchance remember that they were in their laboratories first of all for